Signal Messenger: Using Signal Will Soon Cost $50 Million a Year

A Signal logo next to a financial ledger showing infrastructure costs

Signal — the encrypted messaging app that has become the default recommendation for anyone who cares about privacy — announced that its annual operating costs are approaching $50 million. For a service with no advertising, no data collection, and no subscription fees, that number raises a question most users have never considered: who pays for all of this?

The answer reveals something important about the economics of privacy-focused technology and the fragility of the infrastructure we depend on.

The Cost Breakdown

Signal’s costs fall into categories familiar to anyone who has run a technology service at scale:

Infrastructure. Servers, bandwidth, storage, and the cloud services required to deliver messages reliably to hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Signal processes billions of messages. Each message must be encrypted end-to-end, routed to the correct device, stored temporarily if the recipient is offline, and delivered with minimal latency. This is not cheap compute.

Personnel. Signal employs roughly 50 people. In the San Francisco Bay Area tech labor market, competitive salaries for engineers with the expertise to build and maintain a secure, scalable messaging platform are significant. Signal needs to compete with companies that pay considerably more and offer equity.

Telephony. Registration and verification require SMS delivery, which has per-message costs that scale linearly with user growth. In some regions, SMS delivery is expensive and unreliable, requiring fallback systems.

Compliance and legal. Operating globally means navigating different regulatory environments, responding to legal requests, and maintaining the legal infrastructure to protect user privacy when governments come knocking.

Why $50 Million Is Both Large and Small

For context: WhatsApp, which provides a similar service (also end-to-end encrypted, based on the Signal Protocol), operates within Meta, a company with $117 billion in annual revenue. WhatsApp’s costs are absorbed into a corporate structure that monetizes its user base through the broader Meta ecosystem. The service itself does not need to be financially self-sustaining.

Telegram, which is not end-to-end encrypted by default, has raised billions in venture capital and launched a premium subscription tier. It can subsidize free service with investor money and premium revenue.

Signal has neither. It is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit funded primarily by individual donations and a significant initial grant from Brian Acton, the WhatsApp co-founder who left Meta over privacy disagreements. That grant — reportedly $50 million — seeded the Signal Foundation. The irony of a WhatsApp fortune funding WhatsApp’s privacy-focused competitor is not lost on anyone.

The Sustainability Question

The core tension is this: Signal’s value proposition is that it does not monetize users. No ads. No data sales. No premium tier (so far). No corporate parent subsidizing operations. This is exactly what makes Signal trustworthy, and exactly what makes its funding model precarious.

$50 million per year is a lot to raise through donations. The Signal Foundation has been transparent about this challenge, publishing its financial information and making direct appeals to users. But donation-funded services are vulnerable to donor fatigue, economic downturns, and the simple reality that most users of free services never pay for them.

The free-rider problem is acute for privacy tools. Users who care enough about privacy to install Signal are a self-selected group, but even within that group, the conversion rate from “uses Signal” to “donates to Signal” is low. Most people treat messaging as a utility — something that should exist, work reliably, and cost nothing.

What This Means for Privacy Technology

Signal’s financial challenge illustrates a broader problem: privacy-respecting technology is expensive to build and hard to fund. The dominant business model of the internet — offer a free service, collect user data, sell targeted advertising — works precisely because it externalizes the cost to user privacy. Services that refuse to externalize that cost must find another way to pay the bills.

Some options exist. Proton (makers of ProtonMail and ProtonVPN) uses a freemium model — basic service is free, premium features cost money. This works when the service has features that premium users will pay for. For a messaging app, where the core feature is sending messages, the upgrade path is less obvious.

Mozilla funds Firefox primarily through search engine deals (Google pays to be the default search engine). This creates an uncomfortable dependency on a company whose business model is the one Mozilla ostensibly opposes.

Signal could introduce a premium tier — perhaps with features like larger file transfers, scheduled messages, or enhanced group management. But any premium feature risks creating a two-tier user experience that undermines the egalitarian ethos of the project.

The Broader Lesson

The $50 million figure is a reality check. Running reliable, secure, private infrastructure at internet scale costs real money. When a service is free and does not sell your data, the money must come from somewhere. For Signal, it comes from donations and the goodwill of a relatively small number of supporters.

This is admirable. It is also fragile. If you use Signal — or any privacy-respecting service that does not charge you — consider what it would mean if the money ran out. Then consider whether the service is worth a few dollars a month to you.

The infrastructure of privacy is not free. Someone always pays. The question is whether it is the users, the donors, or — through data extraction — the users again, without their knowledge.